In 1971 Lord (Victor) Rothschild published his report for the government, The organisation and management of government R&D, and Sir Peter Medawar launched a campaign for the election of Sir Karl Popper to Fellowship of the Royal Society. We explore these two developments in the contexts of the then current views of the role and purpose of science, and their underpinning philosophy. Although the political battle was won by Rothschild, resulting in major changes to the funding and management of applied R&D, we argue that, despite this, Medawar's campaign for Popper provided an embattled science community with a philosophical basis for defending pure research and the unity of basic and applied science.
INTRODUCTION
The year 1971 was momentous for science in the UK and for the Royal Society. Early that year, one Fellow of the Royal Society, Lord (Victor) Rothschild, discussed with the President and selected Fellows of the Society a report for the government, The organisation and management of government R&D, that would set the scientific community by its ears when it was published in November. In the same year, another Fellow, Sir Peter Medawar, started a campaign to bring the philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper to the Fellowship. We explore here the relationships between these two developments in the contexts of the then current understandings of the role and purpose of science, and the philosophical and epistemological concepts underpinning them. Although the political battle was won by Rothschild and resulted in major changes to the funding and management of applied R&D, we argue that, in campaigning for Popper's Fellowship, Medawar constructed versions of Popper for the scientific community to embrace in the face of particular concerns over the functionality of pure research and the unity of basic and applied science.
POPPER'S CHAMPION
In previous work, one of us (Calver) has demonstrated Medawar's credentials as Popper's chief apostle.
1 For those disposed not to plough through Popper's hundreds of pages of closely detailed analysis of scientific inquiry, Medawar presented a truncated and evidently stylish and sophisticated Popper. Medawar had brilliantly outlined the history of the 'hypothetico-deductive' method of scientific inquiry in his 1967 The art of the soluble, which was widely read by the science community and by the public at large in its paperback edition (1969) .
2 From Popper's notions of bold conjectures and the elusive quest for absolute certainty sprang Medawar's ideas for the enhancement of science's prestige and autonomy. Medawar's Popper was not the simple falsificationist that other disingenuous philosophers would have had scientists believe. The ideals of creativity, imagination, scepticism and purity, for Medawar and for fellow 'Popperian Knight' Sir Hermann Bondi, were all essential to their promotion of Popper's philosophy as the common language through which science should be understood. The events of 1971 were to prompt Medawar to construct a yet further Popper, using his thinking to support a model of the unity of science. 3 Medawar told Popper that, quite out of the blue, one day in May 1971, Peter Krohn FRS had asked Medawar, in all innocence, why Popper was not a Fellow of the Royal Society. Medawar's reply was that the only defensible excuse was that no one had yet thought to nominate him. In following up this germ of an idea, Medawar enquired whether Popper would grant him the favour of allowing him to propose his name, because it would add 'enormous lustre to the Society if you were to become one of its Fellows'. Popper was, quite understandably, thrilled. 4 Medawar, assisted by Bondi, at once undertook the task of proposal, although, as he later said to Popper, they had no difficulties in readily garnering support. He later considered that it would have been a breach of protocol to reveal to Popper the names of all of those who had supported his candidature, although he apparently felt no compunction at the time in revealing that among them were Jacques Monod, Francis Crick, Solly Zuckerman and Jack Eccles. 5 Among those not mentioned to Popper was the geneticist Otto Frankel, who shared Popper's background as a Viennese Jew and had also attended the Piaristen Staatsgymnasiums Wein VIII; other signatories were Krohn, the biologists Rupert Billingham and Martin Pollock, the immunologist James Gowans and the physicists John Ziman, George Thomson and Dennis Gabor. Also among them was Sir Frederick Dainton, chairman of the government's Council for Science and Technology, whose role in the Rothschild controversy we discuss below.
EDWARD HEATH'S NEW TRUMPETER
In the same period during which Medawar was initiating his campaign on Popper's behalf, a rather less than cordial meeting was convened by two friends of Medawar's: Sir Alan Hodgkin, President of the Royal Society, and Rothschild, recently appointed by the new N. Calver and M. Parker Prime Minister, Edward Heath, as head of a new 'think tank'-the Central Policy Review Staff (CRPS)-intended to inject some much-needed vigour into the process of policymaking. 6 Heath had been badly shaken by the death of Ian MacLeod, his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Apparently recovered from appendicitis, MacLeod had suffered a fatal heart attack on 20 July 1970, less than five weeks after moving into office. It was a shattering blow for Heath because, since 1965, he had learned to draw on MacLeod's political judgement; he was the one senior colleague with the independence of mind to challenge the Prime Minister, and one whose advice Heath would always have valued. But also, at a deeper political level, MacLeod was the one charismatic personality that the government possessed. 'Politically', as several ministers put it, 'he was our trumpeter.' 7 When the Tories had decided on Heath as their new leader five years previously, he had seemed the candidate of change: 'thrusting, pugnacious, aggressive', as Panorama had called him, 'the man for those Conservatives who think the party needs "a tiger in its tank".' Now, outflanked by Enoch Powell over issues such as immigration and increasingly recognized as turgid, taciturn and withdrawn, Heath imperatively needed another single-minded champion. The maverick Victor Rothschild would come to fit the bill perfectly. 8 Rothschild, the third choice 9 for the job of heading-indeed, creating-the CPRS, was in some ways a surprising appointment: a hereditary peer who never attended the House of Lords because he disapproved of it, and not a member of the Conservative Party. Indeed, he was known to be a Labour sympathizer, if not a supporter. The reasons for his selection are somewhat obscure. It has been suggested that he had come under consideration when asked, a few years previously, to investigate security arrangements at the atomic energy research station at Culham. In the event, he proved an inspired choice and one that captured the public and political imagination. Rothschild provided a certain amount of glamour: research scientist, MI5 bomb disposal expert during World War II, Cambridge don and banker, and someone who was always an enigmatic figure long before his alleged role in the Spycatcher affair in 1986. Physically a big man, expressing an abundance of verbal wit in a mellow voice, his presence was likened to that of Charles de Gaulle.
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The CPRS was the most imaginative and successful product of Heath's 1970 reforms-at least according to those who worked in it.
11 Starting work on 1 February 1971, the Think Tank-as it was colloquially known-generated a certain amount of media hype as a result of Rothschild's 'buccaneering style'. 12 To provide Heath with longer-term strategic alternatives, Rothschild and his Think Tank, the Evening Standard intoned, was a sort of 'intellectual commando squad' to outflank the 'desk-bound immobilized civil servants'.
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The brief of the CPRS as set out in the White Paper covered the clarification and monitoring of the government's overall policy strategy, the establishment of priorities and the analysis of alternatives and long-term problems.
14 It was orchestrated by a task force of lively minds free from bureaucratic restraints, to 'rub ministers' noses in the future', as Douglas Hurd, Heath's political secretary and later Margaret Thatcher's Foreign Secretary, described it. 15 As to its style, Rothschild said (in conversation with the historian Peter Hennessy in 1983), in a phrase of Aldous Huxley's, it was 'a case of routine punctuated by orgies'. 16 As the leader of the young and dynamic CPRS team, Rothschild would prove to be perfectly suited 'to think the unthinkable' and no respecter of sacred cows. His methods of working were, to say the least, idiosyncratic; he was impulsive, quirky and touchy, The Rothschild controversy and his style was variously confrontational and conspiratorial. His blunt and witty use of English-to which we shall return-earned him some enemies among civil servants and ministers. 17 Importantly, in the context of this paper, Rothschild characterized himself as a 'rationalist', 18 frequently referring to his conclusions as 'common sense' or 'self-evident' (a favoured term). 19 While there is no evidence of Rothschild's consciously taking any particular philosophical stance, his assumptions appear implicitly to be of the positivist bent that Medawar was so concerned to counter. Where Rothschild was comfortable with arbitrary distinctions between pure and applied science, 20 Medawar (as we discuss below) believed passionately in the unity of science and the common creativity of scientists whether addressing 'pure' or 'applied' problems.
MEDAWAR VERSUS ROTHSCHILD
Rothschild and Medawar started out as friends, so much so that, after Medawar's stroke, suffered while giving his Presidential Address to the British Association in 1969, some of his convalescence had been spent at Rothschild's residence in Barbados. The two men enjoyed playing backgammon, at which Medawar was, as with everything else-including the mixing of martinis-very good.
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The stroke had the consequence that Medawar, whom everyone had expected to become President of the Royal Society in 1970, had to stand aside. His friend, Alan Hodgkin, who got the job in his stead, had a great admiration and affection for Medawar dating back to 1934, and later recalled that he forever respected Medawar because 'he showed no bitterness', whether about his stroke or about not being in a position to take up the presidency. The two, particularly at this time, continued to see a great deal of each other, both inside and outside the Society.
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Thus in May 1971 it fell to Hodgkin to convene the meeting of a selected number of Fellows with Rothschild at which the latter would explain to the Society where he had got to in considering a brief from the government to examine the resources and objectives of government research and development. This ad hoc committee subsequently, through Hodgkin, corresponded with Rothschild and significantly shaped the Royal Society's response to the proposals in Rothschild's eventual report to the government.
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The backdrop to the request to Rothschild to consider this issue had been the growing recognition in the later 1960s that the financial support for the Research Councils could not continue to grow at the substantial rate (up to 13% per annum) of previous years, especially in view of the significant financial crises of that time. 24 The Heath government set in place several actions designed to make the government, and particularly government spending, more effective, leading up to the White Paper The reorganisation of government.
25 Examining the government's large and growing R&D expenditure fitted into this.
In practice, Rothschild was careful at the meeting to dismiss fears that his inquiry was concerned with the total scale of expenditure of the Research Councils, or with basic research. Activities of the University Grants Committee and the Science Research Council were also excluded from his considerations, which were wholly centred on what he termed applied research. He claimed not to have had sight at that time of the emerging conclusions of a report that the government had commissioned in parallel from Sir Ominously, though, Rothschild understood it to have advanced a set of categories of research-tactical, strategic and basic, whose connections the CSP regarded as particularly close, complex and subtle (reflecting the unity of science)-with which he profoundly disagreed. 27 Dashing hopes that he would acquiesce to Dainton's recommendation in favour of the status quo-'scientists being the best to judge what scientists do', as Rothschild characterized it-he was unrepentant in asserting that 'users of the end-product are the best people to control and finance applied research.' 28 Medawar, although not present at this meeting, would have quickly been made aware of its import by Hodgkin. Medawar 'disliked Rothschild's ideas intensely', judging them to be constituted of nothing more than 'pejorative innuendo' with the sole intention of convincing everybody that 'we were, after all, a nation of shopkeepers'. 29 The relationship between Medawar and Rothschild cooled; the days of warm sociability in the Caribbean gave way to the frostiness of the debate between Whitehall and the Society over the direction of scientific research.
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In this context, the reference that Medawar offered in support of Popper's candidacy is revealing on several levels. Previously, in his promotion of the hypothetico-deductive method, Medawar had turned to history to demonstrate its currency long before Popper did. He repeatedly acknowledged the debt that Popper's method owed to significant earlier thinkers, particularly William Whewell. Although this may merely have been an act of proper convention, it would also have served to highlight the intellectual strength behind Popper's ideas. 31 Perhaps not surprisingly, given how anxious Medawar was for his friend's candidacy to succeed, he now attributed this methodology exclusively to Popper. Moreover, Medawar was keen to present Popperian philosophy as enlightening and inspiring for the working scientist as opposed to the prosaic monotony demanded by inductivism: 32 Karl Popper. The world's leading methodologist of science. In his early work he corrected the philosophical opinions of the Vienna Circle in a way that is now universally agreed to be just. In 1934 in his major work Logik der Forschung he formulated what has come to be called the hypothetico-deductive scheme of scientific methodology that has now virtually supplanted the inductivism of John Stuart Mill.
ROTHSCHILD'S 'CAT FOR ALL PIGEONS' 34
Medawar's conviction that Popper's Fellowship would add 'enormous lustre to the Society' was heartfelt, 35 but it was also, we will argue, timely, in the context of the political debate that would unfold on the publication of the government's Green Paper A framework for government research and development in November 1971. 36 This was, in reality, the vehicle for the report by Rothschild on The organisation and management of government R&D.
Accompanying Rothschild's report was that of Dainton and the CSP on The future of the Research Council system, but this latter appears, at this stage, to have been included merely for political verisimilitude; the one-page Green Paper more or less ignores the CSP's views and showed every sign of accepting in advance Rothschild's main and, in the context of then current thinking about the independence of research, revolutionary conclusion:
with a practical application as its objective, must be done on a customer -contractor basis. The customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer pays. 37 This conclusion led to a recommendation to transfer applied research funding from the Research Councils to government department 'customers'. As Jon Agar has characterized it, market forces would henceforth shape government-funded science policy. 38 That this conclusion was shocking to the science community is demonstrated by the flood of letters to the daily papers and scientific journals, but Philip Gummett records nonetheless the apparent inability on the part of scientists to organize their opposition to this Green Paper effectively. This was compounded, in his view, by a clearly rooted lack of unanimity within the scientific community (some of whom, at least, backed Rothschild) and a lack of a coherent political organization. Scientists were split by discipline, by place of work and by professional association or union. There was, most seriously, no one body through which the views of scientists could have been channelled into the public arena. Although governments have frequently turned to the Society for the 'scientists' view', it was doubtful, Gummett concluded, how far the opinions of 'that august but self-selected body' could be taken as representative of scientists as a whole. The Society, being composed of 'paradigmatic leaders' chosen for their eminence in their fields, rather than 'institutional leaders', was ill-equipped to deal with the 'organisational and political imperatives' with which science must contend. 39 Overall, however, such a characterization fails to recognize that the Society was both a conduit for the wider scientific community and able to effect an informed representation over and above those administered through more recognized channels and conventions. 40 In this context, Medawar's developing view of Popper's approach offered the beleaguered Society, and indeed the wider scientific community, a counter-argument to Rothschild's harsh division of pure and applied research, providing a conceptual justification for the unity of science and the independence of research.
NON-MEETING OF MINDS
Hodgkin and his ad hoc committee subsequently set to work to formulate a response to his proposals. One of its members, Lord Kearton, 41 spoke of how senior civil servants considered that scientists were spending a lot of money and should therefore come up with something useful. Although sympathizing with the other members' concerns, he advised exercising restraint in their response to what they suspected were Rothschild's real plans-to cut spending. Kearton's approach, however, was not adopted. The minute of the meeting of 25 May 1971 was emphatic: Rothschild and his inquiry were 'tarnished by preconceived and indefensible notions'. Given as evidence was Rothschild's distinction between applied and pure research, and his insistence that user departments were equipped to direct research. 42 In stark contrast, the committee considered that there was much advantage to be had from the Dainton report. 43 Aside from its alternative and overlapping categories of basic, strategic and tactical science, seen as a spectrum within a unified process, it was, crucially, emphatic that any further interference with the autonomy of the Research Councils should be avoided. Dainton and the CSP envisaged the councils' retaining considerable freedom to formulate N. Calver and M. Parker policies and to fund projects from their own budgets. Thus the principles of existing scientific responsibility and of judgement on scientific merit by the Research Councils would be preserved, as would the system whereby those who made decisions on scientific programmes and awards would be known and respected by working scientists. The committee therefore concluded that Dainton's proposals should provide the basis for future representations. 44 Rothschild, nonetheless, had raised fundamental questions in a letter to Hodgkin. Was it right for those associated with the Research Councils to be formulating the Society's response to his inquiry? In other words, was there not a clear case of vested interests at play? Rather disingenuously, perhaps, he went on:
During the course of your meeting you said 'we represent the scientists' point of view, both pure and applied'. You will probably agree that somebody must represent, or take into consideration, the point of view of another group which, for want of a better name, I will call the public or some body representing the public. In our discussion, I attempted without success, to try and represent both points of view. But it does not seem rewarding simply to assert that the Civil Service cannot cope with R&D. I attempted to explain without, I think, much success that I believed Government R&D, excluding pure, basic or fundamental research, should be commissioned, paid for and monitored by the user, customer or client. 45 The committee seem to have interpreted this as a signal not to enter into further dialogue; in this light, the committee was forced to consider a wholesale revision of its approach to the political debate. It now advocated that the Society should 'disassociate itself from the view that scientists were the best people to decide what scientists should do'. Therefore there was little advantage to be gained by appealing to the past (that is, the Haldane Principle 46 ) in the Society's argument. Instead, in direct opposition to what the Society saw as Rothschild's dismissal of the 'unity of science', the Society should offer examples of how only pure research could generate far-reaching-and ultimately lucrative-advances, with penicillin and X-rays being just two instances. 47 
HEAT BUT NOT LIGHT
In his Anniversary Address on 30 November 1971, just days after the publication of the Green Paper, Hodgkin referred to unnamed sources who sought to persuade him that this special occasion would be the perfect platform from which to launch the Society's response. However, a greater number considered that, if a President were seen to be adopting too strong a position, it would risk the loss of public sympathy. The majority judged it simply to be an improper occasion to canvass wider support but wholly proper to initiate a responsible democratic debate. Correspondingly, a thoroughly measured Hodgkin sought wider counsel. Radically, by the standards of Society custom, he declared:
We will do our best to obtain a representative selection of views. May I take the opportunity of encouraging Fellows to read the Green Paper (A framework for government research and development) and to send me their comments as soon as possible. Having said this much, it would be a mistake to give my own initial reactions to the new proposals and I shall say no more on the present occasion. The timing of events thus leaves me free to follow my own inclination which is to talk about some The Rothschild controversy matter of scientific interest. You may feel that this is fiddling while Rome burns [our emphasis] but, if it does nothing else, my preference for a scientific discourse will show that I regard the improvement of natural knowledge as the central function of the Royal Society. 48 Resulting coverage, however, painted the Society as bland and cautious. The Times was particularly damning, representing Hodgkin as advocating merely 'extensive consultation within the scientific community before any major change was introduced into the method of financing research and development'. This was linked with the hope that the present system 'will not be dissipated by changes that are too radical or too rapid'. 49 Rothschild, meanwhile, unashamedly exploited this hesitation, influencing the media with his flair for rhetoric. His suitability for the task he had been set, exemplified by his adroitness of thought and directness of speech, compared favourably with the rather pedantic and leaden-footed response from the Society. For instance, as he represented it to The Times, his appointment was due solely to his own particular qualities. After all, he had been a Cambridge scientist who made his own contribution to research (on the classification of living animals). He had been chairman of the Agricultural Research Council from 1948 to 1958 and was, from 1961 until his secondment to the government, head of research at Shell-something, he was not slow to point out, that meant he had been head of 10 000 people with a £60 million budget. Few other scientists, he would reiterate, particularly his critics, had that kind of experience. Moreover, as he loved to emphasize: 'I could have set 50, or 100, or however many scientists were needed to evaluate the whole field of government research and development; but that would have taken two or three years.'
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He had powerful friends, too. Although with the promise of full consultation, the government in the Green Paper had already stated that it 'endorsed his customercontractor principle' and considered that it should be 'implemented in respect of applied research and development carried out or sponsored by the government, whether by the Research Councils or elsewhere'. 51 Moreover, the device of publishing his report simultaneously with Dainton's was brilliant political gamesmanship. Even the left-wing New Statesman noted that Rothschild's 'trenchant style and taste for clear edges made the Dainton report appear somewhat verbose', and that he possessed a quite unfair degree of 'elegance and wit'. 52 The Guardian, also to the left of the political spectrum, considered that, although highly provocative, Rothschild could not be easily misunderstood. Tellingly, it concluded that however divisive and dogmatic it was, the report was merely provoking senior scientists to gentle murmurings from the comfort of the green leather of the Athenaeum.
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Faced with a barrage of criticism from those who judged from this that their autonomy would be under threat, an implacable Rothschild publicly mocked the 'squeals of anger, Gadarene-like in their intensity, from the scientific establishment', delighting in the fact that 121 scientists and doctors had penned letters of protest to The Times. 54 He did not have it all his own way: Rose 55 recounts Rothschild's unhappiness at the criticism he received during a House of Lords debate, and Peter Collins notes that Rothschild complained later that the scientific community, with few exceptions, had been hostile to his report, had largely misunderstood it, and had mounted a 'major, well-organised public campaign' against the recommendations dealing with the Research Councils. 56 However, within the scientific community, the general view hardened into sheer frustration at its failure to construct an articulate opposition to Rothschild. He, as a N. Calver and M. Parker consequence, had had the 'lion's share of the publicity, and throughout the cards have been stacked in his favour'. 57 The government's open declaration of support for Rothschild, it was judged, had also enabled it to steal a march within the debate. Conversely, not only the Society but also Dainton and the Research Councils had been moderation exemplified. The hierarchy of the Society was, as we know, placing principle before expedience. Following Hodgkin's directive for Fellows to submit their responses to the report, that decision was vindicated:
The Rothschild report, with its air of gleeful mischief, is obviously a deliberately provocative coat-trailing exercise. It is all the more important, therefore, not to fall into the trap of semi-hysterical breast-beating. In particular portentous cotton-wool statements about the sanctity of scientific research will go down like a lead balloon. A calmly non-emotive, analytical approach will pay much better dividends. 58 Organizations that sought to counter Rothschild seemed only to emphasize the weakness of the working scientists' position. The Association of University Teachers could do no more than express its alarm that the 'Government should make positive statements implying acceptance of certain basic principles of the Rothschild report before discussion has taken place.' 59 Nature despaired of the Medical Research Society, which at its annual meeting adopted the lamely unconstructive resolution that 'this society disagrees entirely with the principles stated in his report by Lord Rothschild'.
60
When Dainton did eventually venture into the public sphere, he sought to build his case on the question of funding for science. In fact, as he represented it: 'Britain was spending about £150 million a year on basic and strategic science-the price of an ounce of good tobacco a week for each employed member of the population.' 61 But, as Rothschild's supporters pointed out, the report did not suggest that the amount of funding for any form of scientific research should be reduced. The object of the proposals was to ensure proper customer control of that part of the resource for research that the government decided should be devoted to the pursuit of practical objectives. In fact, in their judgement, his proposals were concerned only with £27 million-worth of work, so the customercontractor principle only concerned the status of one-sixth of the amount that Dainton referred to (and excluded expenditure through the Science Research Council and the Social Science Research Council altogether).
62 New Statesman conceded the point that Dainton was, at best, engaging in something of a marginal dispute. Thus anybody wishing publicly to oppose Rothschild, if they were 'prudent', should be 'thankful that the case for more lay control of scientific expenditure had been put so moderately'. 63 Also in the pillory was Sir Harold Himsworth, former director of the Medical Research Council. Readers of The Times were rather loftily told that he, for one, was opposed to Rothschild. He chose to resist Rothschild on the grounds that the Haldane Principle 64 still provided an appropriate basis for the management of British public expenditure on scientific research. 65 Yet, as the Society itself had judged, Haldane had become irrelevant to the present debate; Nature dismissed this argument on the grounds that 'the Haldane principle has become an archaic survivor from the past'; it feared that Himsworth's intervention could have marked the point when excessively ardent defenders of an entrenched position would make it impossible for others to adopt more relevant arguments against the report.
66 Writers of the 120 letters to The Times were wholeheartedly against Rothschild's proposals; however, as a despondent New Scientist pointed out, most of the adverse comments did little other than reiterate a 'Panglossian The Rothschild controversy view of British research organization' and that the 'report and recommendations present a threat to the well-being of British science which must be resisted'. 67 Rothschild responded to the more particular themes within the letters to The Times with great verve and mordant wit-together with a political finesse that could only further undermine the long-awaited response from the Society. For instance, opponents worried that all future basic and strategic research undertaken by the councils would be curtailed by officious government departments. The reality would be, Rothschild pointed out, that if it was deemed necessary, such speculative work could be commissioned within applied research and development. Although his report did not take into account the future commercial or applied value of discoveries made during basic research, he in fact deeply respected and appreciated the value of such discoveries, but not that they should be relied on to the exclusion of other methods of achieving practical objectives. 68 Rothschild also seized on the opportunity to pour political and ideological scorn on those who were, as he saw it, obsessed with any encroachment on their practices. He saw this response as woeful, particularly as an answer to why pure research should be done and at whose behest. And, crucially, as we have seen above, Rothschild's views chimed with the current political climate. So he and many others would excuse the public if they also took 'much of the pontification to which we are subjected with a grain of salt'. 69 Scientists would, rather as a matter of course, not wish for their autonomy to be eroded. But this, he rather impishly pointed out, was all that mattered to the scientific community, and this could be read in their arguments, which were at best 'varied in their relevance and justification' and not helpful to rational dialogue. Instead he declared that science as a whole was not an activity to be undertaken in isolation; that it must be part of 'society's integrated effort to make the world a better place'. Scientists, naturally, would make some contribution towards the identification and fulfilment of customers' needs for research but he declared that it was not for them exclusively to determine what those needs were. Thus it was for 'democratic society itself and its elected representatives' to give scientists their 'marching orders'. 70 New Scientist, articulating the thoughts of a beleaguered scientific community, concluded that there would not be sufficient public sympathy at any meaningful level unless the scientific community were to favour light over heat in any future arguments. 71 A PHILOSOPHY OF UNITY AND AUTONOMY It was Medawar who possessed the necessary acumen, status and wit to tackle Rothschild's acclaimed comments head-on; he was a worthy challenger to a dextrous and colourful adversary. Here it should be remembered that Rothschild spent much of his time in the commercial world, with Medawar questioning to what extent he appreciated the value of scientific research for its own sake as opposed to its effect on the balance sheet. For Rothschild, the customer -contractor relationship must have seemed self-evident, 72 but for Medawar, who would very probably have gained some insight into Rothschild's conceptual thinking, such as it was, during the period of their friendship, this was the weakness in his position. Therefore, no doubt for the benefit of his blue-sky-thinking colleagues, he attacked Rothschild's attitude to pure research by quoting Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic: 'the man who knows the price of everything and the value of N. Calver and M. Parker nothing'. 73 As far as Rothschild and like-minded pragmatists were concerned, Medawar argued that the sole reason for changing the research system was that Whitehall bureaucrats were terrified of any political scrutiny or criticism of their judgement-like, for instance, the possibility of being asked in the House of Commons questions such as: 'Is the Minister aware that some of the money intended for the promotion of medical research is being directed by scientists towards a study of feeding behaviour in the development of the oystercatcher?' 74 Crucially, however, Medawar was able to balance such hyperbole with more cerebral reasoning, enjoying as he did a long-standing reputation as a highly accomplished protagonist of scientific method. From being a disciple of Popper's, considering him to be the only methodologist whose interpretation of the scientific process was simultaneously illuminating, realistic and practically helpful, Medawar had now established himself as an influential chief spokesman for Popperianism.
Before the Rothschild controversy, in the context of the 'two cultures' debate, 75 Medawar argued that inductivism had spawned the erroneous belief that there was a great divide between creative thinkers-artists, poets and writers, who worked through the imagination-and scientists, who were, intellectually speaking, mere collectors of facts. Inductivism, as he saw it, had become sociologically toxic. His contention was that, judged by sheer intellectual rigour alone, all scientists, whether 'pure' or 'applied', were Popperian, possessing the same creative and imaginative qualities as those in the humanities. Such emboldening advocacy on behalf of the working scientist ensured Medawar a firm base from which to launch his subsequent criticisms of Rothschild's report. 76 That said, some of Medawar's previous Popperian pronouncements risked Rothschild's derision. Shortly before his stroke and subsequent convalescence at Rothschild's home, Medawar gave his lecture Induction and intuition in scientific thought. In it he gently mocked the historical and philosophical anachronisms that led to a belief in the scientific method, because in his view there was no codified set of rules for research and inquiry. There was, however, such a thing as the Popperian hypothetico-deductive method; and in his view scientists observed its rules unconsciously and did not understand it to the extent of being able to articulate it clearly. 77 After the publication of his report, Rothschild seemed to spoof a querulous Popperian, asking: 'Do you really not understand that we can't just be told to cure cancer or coronaries? . . . Have you not heard that research can't proceed in straight lines and it often has to go off course, even to the extent of making U-turns?' 78 He went on to reiterate his view that, despite these expostulations, those who used the research, and paid for it, had a reasonable interest in what their money was spent on, although he made clear that customer and researcher would have to have a dialogue on what was desirable and what achievable, allowing legitimate space for scientific creativity. 79 Medawar, however, aware that the Society was still keen to highlight the practical benefits of the unity of science, especially in the protection of scientific independence from political control, adopted two courses of action. As he understood it, the broad consensus in the 1960s was that pure science was above all an imaginative and exploratory activity. It required no justification outside itself, and its usefulness had no bearing on its value. It was the pursuit of knowledge purely for knowledge's sake. In contrast, applied science was seen as a critical and analytical activity increasing the means available for human action. Despite this seeming dichotomy, there was common ground because a scientist, as
The Rothschild controversy
Medawar had grown to recognize, must indeed be freely imaginative and yet sceptical, creative and yet critical, with the two working in a rapid reciprocation of guesswork and checkwork, proposal and disposal, conjecture and refutation. As Medawar represented it:
The general conception of science, which reconciles, indeed literally joins together, the two sets of contradictory opinions I have just outlined is sometimes called the 'hypothetico-deductive' conception. For our present clear understanding of the logical structure and wider scientific implications of the hypothetico-deductive system we are of course indebted to Karl Popper. 80 Therefore, when it came to corresponding with Hodgkin concerning the Society's response to Rothschild, he judged the report's strict division between pure and applied science to be a methodological anachronism. It would result in harmful consequences to scientific research:
The hard and fast distinction between pure and applied science is a quaint relic of the days when it was widely and authoritatively believed that axioms and generative ideas of some privileged sciences (the 'Pure' Sciences strictly so called) were known with certainty by intuition or revelation, while the Applied Sciences grew out of merely empirical observations concerning 'matters of fact or existence'. The distinction between pure and applied science persisted in Victorian and Edwardian times as the basis of a class distinction between activities that did or did not become a gentleman ('Pure Science' being a genteel occupation and 'Applied Science' having disreputable associations with manual work or with trade). This class distinction is now widely believed to have been rather damaging to this country. 81 Medawar's representation of Popperianism, focused on the unity of science, can be discerned in the official response from the Society to Rothschild-published as he was canvassing support for Popper's Fellowship. Previously the Society had not needed a coherently enunciated philosophy of science. Now, confronted by Rothschild's report, the need to move from the particular to the general became essential. It was made clear that pure and applied research were conducted alongside each other, thereby continuing the efficacy of applied science. 82 In Medawar's view someone who, like Rothschild, thought that research could be successfully prosecuted on the customer -contractor basis profoundly misunderstood the nature of the scientific process. Addressing Rothschild's reference to scientists engaged in pure research playing 'scientific roulette', Medawar's comments were to the point: 'a jealous accusation which in experience is often made by scientific hacks who have spent many laborious hours on inductive fact-hunting exercises without even interesting anybody very much'. 83 More than this, the danger of the Whitehall illusion fostered by Rothschild was that scientists operate the scientific method:
A kind of calculus of discovery which allows them (scientists) to pass by the shortest possible route from problem to solution and from bewilderment to discovery. If such a method existed then a scientific discovery could be premeditated-i.e. could represent the outcome of a declared specific intention to make it. However, the existence of a scientific method is not compatible with the continued employment of real-life scientists for if a scientist failed to make an intended discovery, it could only be because he was ignorant of the Method or too lazy to apply it-both grounds for dismissal. Methodology is incompatible with the notion that scientific discovery can be premeditated. The most we can do is to have a target to aim at and an environment conducive to the exploratory dialogue with nature of which scientific research consists. 84 
N. Calver and M. Parker
Consequently, the problem of determining the cost-effectiveness of research, as Medawar represented it, was a red herring. The notion of predicting future ideas or future theories simply could not be done. It was therefore not possible to predict the future pathway of any research. This was in complete contradiction to Rothschild's customer -contractor approach to science, although it could also be seen as side-stepping Rothschild's legitimate concern for science to be applied to the real-world concerns of customers and users of its results. The arguments, as so often, were in parallel and passing each other by without engagement.
As has been shown, there was a manifestly incoherent and splintered response to Rothschild and his proposals. Rothschild was an assured, polished political operator, capable of simplifying the complex issues involved in the debate. What the leaders of the scientific community were unable to do was to convince others of the errors that resulted from what they saw as an oversimplification. Their appeals to the wider scientific community, to the interested public and to politicians seemed at best muted and disconnected, at worst divisive, shallow and misanthropic, giving the impression that they were cut off from the real world. In particular, they persisted in allowing concerns for their autonomy to cloud any judgement over the political logic behind Rothschild's proposals. So, despite the incisive and intellectually elegant intervention of Medawar's arguments against Rothschild's approach, the result was a foregone conclusion: it was clear from the outset that the government was intent on following the apparent logic of the customer-contractor principle.
However, this bruising encounter with Rothschild had the indirect but still beneficial effect of making the Society and the wider scientific community, particularly those concerned with the functionality of pure research and the maintenance of the unity of science, aware of the need to embrace a coherent understanding of the scientific processone that cut across the various disciplines. The significance of Popper's subsequent Fellowship was that it helped to establish and advertise a non-partisan yet powerful alternative to charges that the scientific community merely had its vested interests at heart, together with a cerebral and nuanced rebuttal of the philosophy underpinning government reforms and, subsequently, of the Kuhnian understanding of 'normal' science, to which Medawar became firmly opposed. Medawar was greatly concerned at Thomas Kuhn's distinction between scientific revolutions and 'normal' science (within established paradigms), both because he felt it attacked the unity and continuity of scientific effort and because 'normal' science smacked of the inductivist, fact-adding approach that he was so anxious to discredit. 85 Similarly, the Society came to understand that science policy was influenced by a broader range of conversations than those conducted in either government committee rooms or its own august chambers, and to recognize the need to embrace wider mechanisms for ensuring that its voice was heard in the public forum. Owing largely to Sir Hermann Bondi's input into the Society's Public Understanding of Science initiative in 1985, Popper's ideas were to be spread to a yet wider audience. 86 Calver's greatest appreciation and thanks go to Charlotte Sleigh, whose wise counsel has been invaluable in bringing this work to fruition.
Parker Tactical science-the science and its application and development needed by departments of state and by industry to further their immediate executive or commercial functions. Strategic science-the broad spread of more general scientific effort that was needed as a foundation for tactical science. It was no less relevant in terms of practical objectives of the sort mentioned above, but wider ranging. Basic science-research and training that had no specific application in view but which was necessary to ensure the advance of scientific knowledge and the maintenance of a corps of able scientists. 
